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THE STATE OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF 
PUBLIC CONTRACTING IN NEW 
ZEALAND AND CANADA  
David Mullan* 
This article evaluates the varying ways in which the courts of New Zealand and Canada respond to 
arguments that government procurement exercises are subject to the principles and remedies of 
public law. While conceding that context is critical and that there are many, often competing 
considerations that are relevant in the evaluation of such arguments, the author contends that the 
courts in both countries should at least on occasion be open to the availability of public law 
remedies for misfired government procurement exercises, and, more importantly, whether by 
judicial review or civil action, to the deployment of public law principles in the assessment of the 
procedural and substantive components of government procurement. More generally, the author 
warns against the movement in both countries in the direction of the assimilation of public 
procurement within existing principles and remedies of private tendering law. 
I PROLOGUE AND INTRODUCTION 
When I was an LLB student at Victoria University of Wellington in the mid to late 1960s, 
George Barton was my instructor in equity. When I was appointed as a junior lecturer, George had 
become Head of Department. In that capacity he took on roles as my mentor and, upon Ken Keith's 
going on leave to take up a United Nations appointment, surrogate LLM thesis supervisor. At a time 
when I was particularly in need of guidance as to my career path, George was readily available to 
both chat, and provide advice and information, but always in a way that recognised that personal 
preferences were important. In that context, he was very positive about my choice to pursue further 
graduate studies in Canada. Thereafter, George continued to be someone to whom I looked for 
  
*  Emeritus Professor of Law, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. In writing this paper in honour of 
George Barton, I was also very conscious of the shadow cast by a New Zealand giant in the field of the 
review of the contractual powers of government, the late Professor Michael Taggart. What I have produced 
is almost certainly only a pale imitation of what Mike would have had to say were he asked to reflect on 
recent developments in this controversial domain. 
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encouragement and guidance. Throughout an academic career that kept me largely in Canada, I 
benefitted from George's critiques of my academic writing, and I was both instructed and stimulated 
by George's accounts of the work in which he was currently engaged. These accounts made me 
more aware than ever of the breadth of George's practice and, more significantly, his knowledge of 
and passion for the law and especially justice. His death came as a shock, and has left a void in my 
life in terms of a relationship that had evolved into a treasured friendship, but which had also 
continued to provide me with grounding in the pursuit of a career in law, even after I had retired 
from the academy. 
When George taught equity, he seemed to me to be the quintessential private lawyer. It was only 
afterwards, when I took international law, that I learned that George's graduate work had been in 
public law and public international law in particular.1 During my time as a graduate student and 
junior lecturer, I benefitted greatly from his knowledge of public law and, in 1970, shortly before 
my departure for Canada, I went to see George in action in court as a public lawyer. The case was, 
of course, Parsons v Burk,2 in which George, acting on behalf of the legendary Wellington 
bookseller Roy Parsons, attempted to enlist the aid of the ancient prerogative writ of ne exeat regno 
to prevent the All Blacks from departing the country for the 1970 tour of South Africa.  
In that brave and imaginative challenge, George was unsuccessful, as he was to be some 11 
years later in 1981 in Ashby v Minister of Immigration.3 This case involved an action for a 
declaration that it would be an invalid exercise of power for the Minister of Immigration to grant 
temporary entry permits to the members of the Springbok rugby team about to embark on the most 
divisive sporting tour in New Zealand history. This time, George failed in both the Supreme (now 
High) Court and Court of Appeal. I do, however, like to think that it was George's advocacy in that 
case, coupled with the agonies of that tour, that ultimately laid the groundwork for the 1985 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Finnigan and Recordan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union,4 
a case in which George did not appear.  
There, the Court of Appeal accorded standing to two members of local rugby clubs to challenge 
the decision of the Council of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union to accept yet another 
  
1  His Cambridge doctoral thesis was on jurisdiction over visiting forces and, following his studies in England, 
he worked for two years in New York at the United Nations Human Rights Division.  
2  Parsons v Burk [1971] NZLR 244 (SC Wellington). 
3  Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222 (CA). 
4  Finnigan and Recordan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union [1985] 2 NZLR 159 (CA). 
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invitation to send the All Blacks to South Africa that year. In delivering the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal, Cooke J (as he then was and one of the three judges in Ashby) famously declared:5  
We are not holding that, not even discussing whether, the [Council's] decision is the exercise of a 
statutory power – although that was argued. We are saying simply that it falls into a special area where, 
in the New Zealand context, a sharp boundary between public and private law cannot realistically be 
drawn. 
Here, some 14 years after Parsons v Burk, the Court of Appeal gave recognition to what was at 
root the theory of the earlier cases: the proposition that, at least in New Zealand, the action of the 
sport of rugby's governing body could transcend the world of purely private law. Given the extent to 
which its decisions had a public impact, both within New Zealand and in terms of New Zealand's 
standing in the community of nations, it could be exposed to public law principles and possibly 
remedies.6  
Since then, issues involving the drawing of the line between private and public law have 
continued to arise in various other contexts, particularly as the role and forms of government have 
evolved, often dramatically. This paper in honour of George is about one such domain: the extent to 
which government contractual dealings (and in particular procurement) are subject to the principles 
and remedies of public law. For these purposes, my principal catchment area will be the case law of 
New Zealand and Canada. This is not, however, primarily a comparative study. Rather, my intention 
is that, by drawing upon the jurisprudence of these jurisdictions (as well as academic commentary), 
I will identify and discuss some of the issues of principle that are exposed by this case law. In short, 
my mission is to try to come to terms with what is involved in establishing a coherent set of 
operating rules in another domain where a sharp boundary between public and private law cannot be 
drawn. 
II THE PROBLEM 
The problem is whether (and if so, to what extent) the law governing government contracting 
(and procurement in particular) is subject to principles and rules that do not affect contractual 
dealings among purely private parties. It is not a new one. Hammond J made this abundantly clear in 
his concurring judgment in the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland 
  
5  At 179. 
6  For a fuller account and analysis, see Michael Taggart "The Impact of Apartheid on Commonwealth 
Administrative Law" in Hugh Corder (ed) Comparing Administrative Justice Across the Commonwealth 
(Juta, Cape Town, 2006) 158 at 168–172. 
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District Health Board.7 There, with particular reference to judicial review of government contracts, 
he describes it as a "twilight" area of the law,8 one that had sprung into prominence over the past 25 
years in the era of "Government by contract".9 He then states correctly that, "[u]nsurprisingly, 
courts have had the same sort of difficulty [as commentators] as to what approach the law should 
adopt".10 
Dr Graham Taylor in the second edition of Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective, agrees: 
"The problem has always been, and remains, how to deal with situations where legality impinges on 
commercial decisions".11 
It is not, however, necessarily a problem for which there is a single answer. Hammond J 
identifies one way of conceiving of the challenge:12 
Leaving to one side any applicable statutory provisions, the problem for the law, stated in the simplest 
terms, is whether to apply private law principles, public law principles, or some admixture of the two. 
Implicit within this characterisation, however, are a range of critical sub-issues. In an era in 
which governments operate or attempt to advance their policies in an increasing variety of formats 
(including, crucially, partnerships with the private sector),13 how much depends on the nature of the 
entity entering into contracts and issuing Requests for Proposals (RFPs)? If one does not leave to 
one side applicable statutory provisions, what are the criteria on which courts should assess statutory 
regimes and provisions for the purposes of determining whether to insinuate public law values into 
the way in which such entities contract? Is there any room for the deployment of public law values 
when the matter comes before the court by way of an action for breach of contract (or even one in 
negligence, misrepresentation, misfeasance in public office, or restitution arising out of a contractual 
setting)? Does judicial review have any role to play in this domain? If so, under what configuration 
  
7  Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board [2008] NZCA 385, [2009] 1 NZLR 776, leave to 
appeal refused Diagnostic Medlab Ltd v Auckland District Health Board [2009] NZSC 10, (2009) 19 PRNZ 
217.  
8  At [351]. 
9  At [352]. 
10  At [356]. 
11  Graham Taylor (ed) Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2010) at 
[2.23]. 
12  Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board, above n 7, at [353]. 
13  Perhaps nowhere more so in terms of innovation and experimentation than in New Zealand. For an account 
of the origins of the New Zealand movement, see Michael Taggart "Corporatisation, Privatisation and 
Public Law" (1991) 2 PLR 77. 
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of 'governmental' contracting powers? To what extent is access to judicial review limited by the 
statutory judicial review regime of a particular jurisdiction? If these and any other threshold barriers 
to judicial review are crossed, should courts apply the same principles of judicial review (both 
substantive and procedural) in this context that they do on other standard judicial review 
applications? Or does the judicial review of the exercise of 'governmental' contractual powers 
demand a special (and possibly narrower) range of judicial review grounds? To what extent, perhaps 
also as a threshold matter, should the courts, where judicial review of contractual activities might 
otherwise be available, look to the adequacy of remedies in contract, tort and restitution as a 
discretionary consideration in the granting of public law remedies? 
I will commence by considering the current law in both New Zealand and Canada respecting the 
deployment of public law values in private law actions (and primarily breach of contract) in matters 
involving the range of what might be characterised as government contracting but with particular 
emphasis on procurement. I will then move to the law of judicial review applicable to such 
activities. There follows a critical evaluation of the current state of the law in which I attempt to 
provide some prescription as to the way in which the evolution of this area of the law should 
proceed.  
III PRIVATE LAW ACTIONS INVOLVING 'GOVERNMENT' 
CONTRACTS 
A Canada 
The 'two contract' theory now applicable in Commonwealth jurisdictions14 to contractual 
tendering was first developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario v Ron Engineering & 
Construction (Eastern) Ltd.15 Under this theory, the submission of a tender in general (though not 
invariably) gives rise to a contract (the so-called Contract A or process contract, to use New Zealand 
terminology). In return for consideration provided by the party soliciting tenders or issuing an RFP, 
the bidder is subject to an obligation to not withdraw the submitted bid, and if successful, to enter 
into the principal contract (Contract B). Estey J justified this rejection of the traditional theory in 
  
14  For England and Wales see Blackpool & Fylde Aero Club Ltd v Blackpool Borough Council [1990] 3 All 
ER 24 (CA); for Australia see Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 
ALR 1 (FC); and for New Zealand see Pratt Contractors Ltd v Palmerston North City Council [1995] 1 
NZLR 469 (HC), and applied subsequently in Transit New Zealand v Pratt Contractors Ltd [2002] 2 NZLR 
313 (CA), affirmed in Pratt Contractors Ltd v Transit New Zealand, [2003] UKPC 83, [2005] 2 NZLR 433 
(PC). 
15  Ontario v Ron Engineering & Construction (Eastern) Ltd [1981] 1 SCR 111. 
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that tenders were no more than a simple offer capable of acceptance at the opening of bids by the 
"owner" on the basis of the need to protect "the integrity of the bidding system".16 
Most of the subsequent leading decisions in Commonwealth jurisdictions have also involved 
government procurement. However, there is nothing in Ron Engineering or any of those other 
leading decisions that in any way suggested that the two contract theory was restricted to 
government procurement. The terms of the various judgments did not in any sense locate the theory 
as one based on public law principles or the special considerations attending government 
procurement. Protecting the integrity of the bidding system was a principle founded in private law 
conceptions of the role of contract law and did not arise out of any more specific public policy 
principle than that.  
What did, however, characterise most of the initial cases adopting and applying the two contract 
theory, including Ron Engineering itself, was that the protection that was being extended was to the 
owner or person soliciting bids, not the bidder. The principal aim was to force bidders once 
committed to a bid to remain in the process. Indeed, little consideration was given initially to the 
content of the consideration that passed from the owner or solicitor of bids to the bidder and that 
served to hold the bidder to the bid. That issue was only to arise once bidders started to sue when 
owners relied on extremely broad clauses in the call for tenders to not award contracts or reject 
specific bids. These clauses typically accorded owners the discretion to not accept any bids, to not 
necessarily accept the lowest bidder and, most dramatically, to accept bids that did not conform with 
the conditions of the call for proposals or tenders – the so-called 'privilege clauses'. If owners had 
such a broad discretion, did bidders in such cases really receive any consideration for their now 
binding promise not to withdraw a bid once it had been submitted? 
In Canada, this issue first potentially surfaced in the Supreme Court of Canada in 1999 in MJB 
Enterprises Ltd v Defence Construction (1951) Ltd.17 It was finessed when the Court held that there 
was an implicit term to the effect that, at least in the absence of an explicit provision to the contrary, 
the owner would accept only compliant bids, an obligation that the owner had not met. A year later, 
however, in Martel Building Ltd v Canada,18 the Supreme Court did enunciate another implied term 
of the contract formed on the submission of a tender: an obligation on the part of the owner to treat 
all bids "fairly and equally."19  
  
16  Ibid at 121. 
17  MJB Enterprises Ltd v Defence Construction (1951) Ltd [1999] 1 SCR 619. 
18  Martel Building Ltd v Canada [2000] 2 SCR 860. 
19  At [88]. 
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Even here though, and in the subsequent 2007 judgment in Double N Earthmovers Ltd v 
Edmonton (City),20 both cases involving public procurement, there was no suggestion that this duty 
to treat bidders "fairly and equally" was premised in any way on the nature of the owner and public 
law principles. In each instance, the recognition of the duty was based on the expectation of the 
bidders when they expended the time and money required to submit a bid.21 In other words, the duty 
was one that the Court conceived of as a component of the protection of the integrity of the bidding 
process. Indeed, in each instance, the Court made it clear that the content of the duty was one that 
had to be linked with the terms of the relevant call for tenders or RFP. Without going as far as 
dealing with the issue of whether this duty was one that could be excluded by an appropriately 
worded term, the Court saw the content of the duty to treat bidders fairly and equally as largely 
predicated on the way in which the owner had framed the call for tenders or RFP. In itself, this is 
quite at odds with any kind of transcendent public law principles applicable to government 
procurement. It is very much a situation specific private law conception of the rights and obligations 
of the parties. 
That also emerges from the limited case law in which the courts have found a violation of the 
duty to treat bidders "fairly and equally". Bid-shopping after the closing of bids in reliance on a 
privilege clause can constitute a breach of that duty. However, it is once again clear from the 
judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the leading case of Stanco Projects Ltd v 
British Columbia (Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection),22 that the categorisation of bid-
shopping as an unfair practice is also predicated on preserving the integrity of the bidding process 
and applicable across both private sector and government tendering processes. Also, while the 
Supreme Court cited Stanco approvingly in Double N,23 it made it clear that subsequent 
negotiations of this kind were unobjectionable if specifically contemplated by the terms of the 
RFP.24 
Indeed, the extent to which the terms of the call for bids or RFP were controlling became 
abundantly clear in the Court's 2010 judgment in Tercon Contractors Ltd v British Columbia,25 
another public sector procurement case. At issue here was liability for accepting a non-compliant 
  
20  Double N Earthmovers Ltd v Edmonton (City) [2007] 1 SCR 116. 
21  See Martel Building Ltd v Canada, above n 18, at [88] and Double N Earthmovers Ltd v Edmonton (City), 
above n 20, at [32]. 
22  Stanco Projects Ltd v British Columbia (Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection) 2006 BCCA 246, 52 
CLR (3d) 1, at [47]–[65]. 
23  Double N Earthmovers Ltd v Edmonton (City), above n 20, at [56]. 
24  Ibid at [58]–[60].  
25  Tercon Contractors Ltd v British Columbia 2010 SCC 4, [2010] 1 SCR 69. 
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bid in the face of an exclusion clause denying compensation to disappointed bidders "as a result of 
participating in this RFP". The entire Court accepted that an exemption clause could cover liability 
for accepting a non-compliant bid. It all depended on whether the clause, if interpreted properly, 
covered the breach in question, and, if it did, whether there was any basis for denying effectiveness 
to the application of the exemption clause by reference to the principles of unconscionability at the 
time of the contract's formation, or some conception of public policy sufficient to override the 
general public policy principle of freedom of contract. 
For the majority, Cromwell J held that the clause properly interpreted did not cover the 
acceptance of a non-compliant bid. However, he expressly endorsed the minority's theory of the test 
that should be applied in the event that the clause did cover the breach complained of.26 In applying 
that approach, there is nothing in the minority judgment that would suggest in any way that the 
dissenting Judges were at all concerned about the fact this was a case involving public procurement. 
Here, as in the previous jurisprudence, the policy considerations at play were nothing other than 
those applied across the entire gamut of public and private sector contracting. Only Cromwell J (and 
then in the context of engaging in "interpretation" of the exemption clause) placed any reliance on 
the public nature of this tendering process. In the course of deploying, for the purposes of construing 
the exemption clause, the principle that the courts should strive to protect the integrity of the bidding 
process, Cromwell J continued:27 
This factor is particularly weighty in the context of public procurement. In that context, in addition to 
the interests of the parties, there is the need for transparency for the public at large. This consideration is 
underlined by the statutory provisions which governed the tendering process in this case. That purpose is 
to assume transparency and fairness in public tenders. 
However, that is a long way from any assertion that, even in the context of a private law action 
such as breach of contract, public procurement processes are amenable to the general procedural and 
substantive principles of public law. It is also clear that the majority has no truck with the argument 
that the public nature of this kind of procurement process should simply eliminate in all 
circumstances and notwithstanding the exclusion clause the acceptance of non-compliant bids. 
  
26  At [62]. 
27  At [68]. Contrast the judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Transit New Zealand v Pratt 
Contractors Ltd, above n 14, at [77], where McGrath J, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
made it clear that, in determining whether a tender process contract came into existence, no relevance was to 
be attached to the fact that the owner was a public body "[W]hether there is a binding promise as to process 
is to be ascertained by applying general principles of contract law concerning contract creation and implied 
terms". 
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In her extensive case comment on Tercon Contractors,28 Jassmine Girgis noted that, as long ago 
as 1999 in a case comment on MJB Enterprises Ltd v Defence Construction (1951) Ltd,29 Stephen 
Waddams had advocated such an approach in the instance of public, as opposed to private tendering 
exercises.30 However, in a case that was ideally suited for a full consideration of whether the public 
nature of a procurement exercise constrained government issuers of calls for tender, the Court 
simply did not acknowledge it as an issue. 
Of course, it might be argued that the Supreme Court of Canada should not be regarded as 
having determined this issue by default, and that the opportunity still exists in an appropriate case to 
argue for the application of principles of public law in the context of a government procurement 
exercise. However, given the extent to which the Supreme Court has consistently developed the law 
governing the conduct of RFPs in a way that both transcends public and private law boundaries and 
places enormous store in that context on the public policy of freedom of contract, it is impossible to 
be sanguine about the chances of success on such an argument at least in the short term. 
Switching the focus to possible claims against public authorities in negligence arising out of 
contracting, including procurement, the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently maintained the 
position that administrative law "[i]nvalidity is not the test of fault and it should not be the test of 
liability".31 Rather, in Canada, issues of negligence liability in the contracting and procurement 
arenas are once again determined by reference to the jurisprudence governing such actions between 
private sector actors, subject however to limiting public law principles in the determination of 
whether there is a sufficient degree of proximity as to establish a duty of care between the parties to 
the process. In this context, in applying the second limb of the Anns v London Merton London 
Borough Council test,32 and in determining whether there are residual policy considerations that 
preclude the imposition of a duty of care, the Canadian courts33 have excluded policy and quasi-
judicial functions from the ambit of the tort and taken into account other considerations bearing on 
  
28  Jassmine Girgis "Tercon Contractors: The Effect of Exclusion Clauses on the Tendering Process" (2010) 49 
CBLJ 187 at 209–211. 
29  MJB Enterprises Ltd v Defence Construction (1951) Ltd, above n 17. 
30  SM Waddams "Tenders for Construction Contracts" (1999) 32 CBLJ 308 at 310.  
31  Welbridge Holdings Ltd v Winnipeg (Greater) [1971] SCR 957 at 969 per Laskin CJC, citing KC Davis 
Administrative Law Treatise (West Publishing Co, St Paul, Minnesota, 1958) vol 3 at 487. 
32  Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 (HL). 
33  See for example Cooper v Hobart 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 SCR 537 at [38]. 
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public bodies' role as contractors such as "the spectre of liability to an indeterminate number of 
people."34  
This invocation of public interest considerations does, of course, mean that there are distinct 
principles that may be relevant to the determination of public authority liability in negligence. 
However, what is obvious is that these principles bear no relationship to the normal common law 
grounds of judicial review but rather are liability limitation factors. In short, they do not beg the 
argument as to the relevance of judicial review principles in governmental liability cases. Indeed, 
more generally, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a statement of principle applicable to both private 
and public procurement processes, has minimised further the extent to which negligence liability 
will arise out of such functions. This was in Design Services Ltd v Canada,35 a public procurement 
case in which a subcontractor of an unsuccessful bidder was attempting to sue the owner, the 
Government of Canada, in negligence. In addition to holding that there was no duty of care between 
the owner and subcontractors of the bidder by reference to both the first and second limbs of the 
Anns test, Rothstein J, delivering the judgment of a unanimous Court, continued:36 
To conclude that an action in tort is appropriate when commercial parties have deliberately arranged 
their affairs in contract would be to allow for unjustifiable encroachment of tort law into the realm of 
contract. 
In other words, contract will remain the primary, if not exclusive venue for the vindication of 
rights arising out of tendering process contracts.37 It is also highly unlikely in the wake of Alberta v 
Elder Advocates of Alberta Society that there is any room for the recognition of a fiduciary duty 
arising out of the relationship between bidders and public authorities in tendering processes.38 
There, the Supreme Court of Canada put paid to any evolution in the direction of imposing on 
public authorities, save in limited and very special circumstances, a general fiduciary duty towards 
those affected by the exercise of their powers.  
Outside of contract, what then is left in the domain of civil liability? Presumably, there may be 
occasions where actions in restitution and misfeasance in public office are appropriate litigation 
responses to failings in the conduct of public procurement.39 In both those situations, the grounds of 
  
34  Ibid at [37]. 
35  Design Services Ltd v Canada 2008 SCC 22, [2008] 1 SCR 737. 
36  At [56]. 
37  Of course, not all calls for tenders and RFPs will give rise to a process contract as Cromwell J makes clear 
in Tercon Contractors, above n 25, at [17]. In those cases, there may be room for the deployment of tort. 
38  Alberta v Elder Advocates of Alberta Society 2011 SCC 24, [2011] 2 SCR 261. 
39  See for example Powder Mountain Resorts Ltd v British Columbia (2001) 94 BCLR (3d) 14 (CA). 
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judicial review of administrative action (and illegality in particular) may very well provide a starting 
point for the making of such claims.  
B New Zealand 
As opposed to Canada, there is New Zealand case law addressing the issue of the invocation of 
the public law principles of judicial review in the context of a breach of contract action arising out 
of a public sector procurement exercise. In Transit New Zealand v Pratt Contractors Ltd,40 at first 
instance,41 Goddard J had expressed her finding of a breach of the tender process contract in terms 
of the common law, judicial review principles of bias. On the facts, Transit's tender evaluation team 
contained members of whom there was a reasonable apprehension of bias. In so far as this amounted 
to an insinuation of public law grounds of review and went beyond the contractual obligation to 
treat all bidders fairly and in good faith, McGrath J of the Court of Appeal rejected the position 
taken by the trial judge:42 
There is also a danger in judicial scrutiny of judgments made in this area if the Court applies standards 
akin to those required in judicial review proceedings involving exercise of statutory powers. … Goddard 
J in this case found against Transit because of her finding of apparent bias of members of the first 
evaluation team, which is of course on the basis of a judicial review concept. We do not consider there is 
a contractual obligation on Transit to avoid conducting its evaluation in a way which would leave a 
statutory officer open to judicial review for apparent bias.  
On further appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,43 Lord Hoffmann made 
reference to this aspect of the Court of Appeal's judgment,44 and, subsequently,45 appeared to 
endorse it by reference to the following statement by Finn J of the Federal Court of Australia in 
Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia, a statement also referenced by the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal.46 The implied term requiring a public authority issuing an RFP to 
act in good faith and fairly:47 
  
40  Transit New Zealand v Pratt Contractors Ltd, above n 14. 
41  Pratt Constructors v Transit New Zealand Ltd HC Wellington CP 221/97, 6 September 2000. 
42  Transit New Zealand v Pratt Contractors Ltd, above n 14, at [98]. 
43  Pratt Contractors Ltd v Transit New Zealand, above n 14. 
44  At [41]. 
45  At [46]–[47]. 
46  Transit New Zealand v Pratt Contractors Ltd, above n 14, at [98]. 
47  Pratt Contractors Ltd v Transit New Zealand, above n 14, at [42]. 
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… does not as such impose on [the employer] under the guise of contract law, the obligation to avoid 
making its decision or otherwise conducting itself in ways which would render it amenable to judicial 
review.  
Nonetheless, Lord Hoffman did deal with the appeal using concepts with at the very least public 
law judicial review analogues. The implied obligations did not mean that Transit "had to act 
judicially".48 It did not involve Transit in affording the bidder "a hearing or enter[ing] into a debate 
with him about the rights and wrongs of" the bidder's conduct in relation to another procurement 
exercise.49 Nonetheless, earlier Lord Hoffmann had referred to the failure of the Court of Appeal to 
address whether the trial judge may in reality have "made findings of actual as well as apparent 
bias", a failure that it excused because of other considerations.50 Lord Hoffmann also went on to 
consider whether the conduct of the members of the evaluation team constituted bad faith such as by 
refusing to take into account information that might show that, on the facts, their views about the 
probity of the bidder were incorrect.  
None of this discussion would have been out of place in a public law judicial review application, 
as apparent from the following characterisation: the nature of the governmental power being 
exercised did not require the imposition of a more judicialised process and it was not appropriate to 
adjudge the evaluators from the perspective of a reasonable apprehension of bias.51 Rather, the 
appropriate test in this context was actual bias. Further, while no formal hearing, or even 
involvement of Pratt, was necessary in relation to the contentious issue of Pratt's prior record in 
procurement exercises, it was nonetheless incumbent on members of the evaluation team not to 
ignore evidence that might contradict their preconceived views. To do so would amount to 
reviewable bad faith even in a context where there was no duty to act judicially.  
This is not meant to assert that the Privy Council was deliberately leaving the matter unresolved. 
However, there is certainly enough wiggle room in the terms of its judgment to suggest that this was 
not the final word as far as New Zealand law is concerned about the deployment of public law 
  
48  At [47]. 
49  Ibid. 
50  At [42]. 
51  In a previous era, this approach might well have been justified in a Canadian judicial review context on the 
basis that those bidding on government contracts were mere applicants or benefit seekers not entitled to the 
protection of the rules of procedural fairness: Webb v Ontario Housing Corporation (1978) 93 DLR (3d) 
187 (Ont CA). In delivering the judgment of the Court, MacKinnon ACJO stated (at [21]): 
The determination to grant her this benefit was made when she was accepted as a tenant [of 
Ontario government subsidised housing]. That decision was one that, in my view, could be made 
by OHC without any intervention of a rule or principle of "procedural fairness."  
 THE STATE OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF PUBLIC CONTRACTING IN NEW ZEALAND AND CANADA 185 
judicial review grounds, both procedural and substantive, in breach of tender process contract 
actions. I would similarly argue, despite my earlier misgivings, that the issue is not precluded 
definitively in Canadian law given the absence of any real discussion of the intersection in breach of 
tender process contracts between the duty to act fairly and treat all bidders equally and the standards 
and grounds of review in Canadian judicial review law.  
IV PUBLIC LAW JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 'GOVERNMENT' 
CONTRACTING 
A Canada 
As early as 1990, a Canadian court accepted the argument that government procurement could 
be subject to judicial review. This was in Thomas C Assaly Corp v Canada, where Strayer J set 
aside a procurement process on the ground of procedural unfairness.52 More specifically, the 
Department of Public Works had led the suing bidder to believe that it was qualified and that the 
contract would be awarded on the basis of price only. In fact, the contract was awarded to the 
highest bidder with the Department treating the suing bidder as disqualified. The Trial Division 
Judge of the Federal Court held that it was incumbent on the Department to provide the suing bidder 
with notice of its changed position and to afford the bidder an opportunity to address that matter. In 
reality, the principle of which review was granted was closely akin to that of legitimate expectation. 
In providing relief, Strayer J noted that the awarding of the contract was an administrative function 
provided for in subordinate legislation authorised by an Act of Parliament. He continued:53 
There are not broad policy functions involving unlimited discretion. Decisions with respect to the 
acceptance or rejection of bids directly affect the interests of persons invited to bid who have undertaken 
the trouble and expense to tender and to hold their property available until a decision is made. There is 
therefore attached a duty of fairness that the courts can enforce by certiorari. 
Two other aspects of this foundational precedent do, however, merit attention. Strayer J was 
careful to base his decision on procedural, not substantive grounds: "If this were exclusively a 
matter of unfairness of result I am not sure it would have been an appropriate case for judicial 
intervention".54 
He also rejected the argument that an action for a breach of contract or the tort of 
misrepresentation was a more appropriate remedy. In so doing, he noted that such an action "would 
  
52  Thomas C Assaly Corp v Canada (1990) 44 Admin LR 89 (FCTD). 
53  At 92.  
54  Ibid. 
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require a trial involving difficult issues of fact and law".55 At least in this context, judicial review in 
the form of a setting aside of the award of the contract served to provide the disappointed bidder 
with another opportunity to secure the contract, something that would have been difficult to 
accomplish through an action based on breach of contract or misrepresentation. 
Five years later, in Gestion Complexe Cousineau (1989) Inc v Canada (Minister of Public 
Works and Government Services),56 the Federal Court of Appeal affirmed the reviewability under 
the then Federal Court Act 1985 of statutorily based tendering processes, in this instance a call for 
bids in relation to the leasing of property.57 A year earlier, the Northwest Territories Court of 
Appeal in Volker Stevin NWT (1992) Ltd v Northwest Territories (Commissioner), had also 
recognised the availability of judicial review of a decision taken on the basis of a process established 
by directive to remove the applicant for relief from the list of those eligible to bid on government 
contracts.58 
However, it was certainly not the case that there was unanimity among Canadian courts as to the 
availability of public law remedies as a way of contesting government procurement decisions. Thus, 
for example, in 1991, the same year as Thomas C Assaly, in St Lawrence Cement Inc v Ontario 
(Minister of Transportation), Montgomery J of the Ontario Court (General Division) refused to 
countenance the availability of certiorari to quash a procurement decision.59 The Ministry's call for 
bids for the construction of a highway was "a commercial contract which in no way affects the 
public interest."60 This was so notwithstanding the existence of a specific statutory provision in the 
Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act 1980 authorising the Minister to enter into 
such contracts.61 
In terms of the subsequent, though still limited, evolution of the jurisprudence relating to this 
issue, there are two developments in the general principles of Canadian judicial review law that 
must be recognised. 
  
55  At 94–95. 
56  Gestion Complexe Cousineau (1989) Inc v Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services) 
[1995] 2 FC 694 (CA). 
57  Federal Court Act RSC 1985 c F-7 (as amended by Crown Liability and Proceedings Act SC 1990 c 8). 
58  Volker Stevin NWT (1992) Ltd v Northwest Territories (Commissioner) (1994) 113 DLR (4th) 639 
(NWTCA). 
59  St Lawrence Cement Inc v Ontario (Minister of Transportation) (1991) 3 OR (3d) 30 (OCGD). 
60  Ibid at 38. 
61  Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act RSO 1980 c 421, s 26(1). 
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First, in Knight v Indian Head School Division No 19,62 the Supreme Court of Canada extended 
the application of the principles of public law procedural fairness to the dismissal of a contractual 
employee of the School Division, an employee whose position was provided for in the relevant 
statute but whose position was technically held at pleasure. In so holding, L'Heureux-Dubé J (for the 
majority) had prefaced her analysis with the following statement of principle:63 
It should be noted at this point that the duty to act fairly does not depend on doctrines of employment 
law, but stems from the fact that the employer is a public body whose powers are derived from statute, 
powers that must be exercised according to the rules of administrative law. It is in that context that the 
employee-employer relationship between the respondent and the appellant Board must be examined, 
with the result that the analysis must go beyond the contract of employment to encompass arguments of 
public policy.  
Later, she continued:64 
As opposed to the employment cases dealing with "pure master and servant" relationships, where no 
delegated statutory powers are involved, the public has an interest in the proper use of administrative 
power by administrative bodies. 
To the extent that these statements rely on principles associated more generally with the exercise 
of specific delegated statutory powers, they obviously have the potential to transcend the context of 
designated statutory positions held at pleasure. They also apply to government procurement in such 
a way as to create an entitlement to review at least in terms of contractual powers having a clear or 
specific statutory origin (as perhaps opposed to contracts merely incidental to the effective operation 
of a government department or other public body). 
All of this changed, however, in 2008 in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick.65 There, in another public 
employment case, the Supreme Court specifically repudiated the aspects of Knight just described.66 
It held that, with very few exceptions,67 where a public office holder's engagement is the subject of 
an employment contract, disputes relating to that contract including dismissal, should be governed 
by the terms of the contract (both express and implied), the common law of contract, and any 
relevant statutory provisions. There was no room for the engrafting of a public law duty of fairness, 
  
62  Knight v Indian Head School Division No 19 [1990] 1 SCR 653. 
63  At 22. 
64  At [32]. 
65  Dunsmuir v New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190. 
66  At [81]–[117]. 
67  At [115]. 
188 (2012) 43 VUWLR  
and the office holder was confined to contractual remedies.68 There were two principal reasons for 
this seismic shift. First, the Court did not accept as workable a distinction between appointments 
with a statutory flavour sufficient to attract the principles and remedies of public law and those 
ordinary government master and servant contracts lacking such a statutory grounding. Secondly, the 
Court also was of the view that the remedies for breach of contract were more appropriate across 
virtually the entire range of government appointments than those available through judicial review. 
Of these reasons, the second has obvious implications for government procurement exercises, the 
first less obviously so. 
The second relevant development in general judicial review law can be traced to the judgment of 
L'Heureux-Dubé J in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).69 This was a case 
involving an illegal overstayer. However, for present purposes, the facts are incidental. What is 
significant is that L'Heureux-Dubé J rejected any clear-cut distinction between law and discretion 
and held that, whatever the nature of the power in issue, courts conducting judicial review on 
substantive grounds were obliged to establish a standard of review before proceeding to a 
consideration of the merits of the challenge. Subsequently, in Dr Q v College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of British Columbia,70 McLachlin CJ, for an unanimous Court, described this as the 
recognition of, "an overarching or unifying theory for review of substantive decisions of all manner 
of statutory or prerogative authorities".71 
What this meant was that in the wake of Dunsmuir, also the leading Canadian authority on 
standard of review, when substantive review is in play, the reviewing court must first conduct a 
standard of review analysis and determine whether the decision in issue is subject to correctness or 
reasonableness review, no matter how awkward the fit. In reinforcement of this, the Supreme Court 
has subsequently applied this approach to review of broad discretionary powers, including the 
promulgation of bylaws by municipalities.72 
  
68  Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada did, however, make it clear that Dunsmuir did not go so far as 
to preclude recourse to public law remedies whenever a contract was in play. This was in Canada (Attorney 
General) v Mavi 2011 SCC 30, [2011] 2 SCR 504, at [47]–[51], where the Court recognised that a limited 
public law duty of procedural fairness applied to the exercise of government power to recover money from 
sponsors of family reunification immigrants to Canada, albeit that that was a power recognised in a contract 
between the Government and the sponsor. Specifically, at [50]: … "while the sponsors' undertakings here 
have some contractual aspects, it is the statutory framework that closely governs the rights and obligations 
of the parties and opens the door to the requirements of procedural fairness". 
69  Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817. 
70  Dr Q v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia 2003 SCC 19, [2003] 1 SCR 226. 
71  At [25], citing David J Mullan Administrative Law (Irwin Law, Toronto, 1999) at 108. 
72  See for example Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District) 2012 SCC 2, 340 DLR (4th) 385. 
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At first blush, that might be seen as having clarified and opened up considerably the review 
possibilities for the substance of public procurement decisions, or at least those with a sufficiently 
statutory flavour. However, in fact, the spectre of even reasonableness review seems more likely to 
have driven lower courts in the direction of using various devices for simply forcing substantive 
review of procurement decisions off the public law agenda. Among the vehicles for achieving this 
abdication are the concept of justiciability, decreasing the range of what is truly public in the 
exercise of contractual power, confining (as foreshadowed by Dunsmuir) bidders on government 
contracts to the realm of the private law of contract, interpreting narrowly the reach of judicial 
review remedial statutes, and the strategic use of judicial discretion not to award public law 
remedies. 
Two modern decisions, in particular, are not only illustrative of these tendencies but also 
indicative of the extent to which the law governing judicial review of procurement decisions in 
Canada is still in a state of turmoil or confusion. 
In 2169205 Ontario Inc (cob Lefroy Freshmart) v Ontario (Liquor Control Board),73 the 
Ontario Divisional Court refused to entertain an application for judicial review of a procurement 
decision under the province's judicial review statute, the Judicial Review Procedure Act 1990.74 The 
procurement in question was an RFP for the operation in a small Ontario community of an agency 
liquor store. The Liquor Control Board had specific statutory authority to establish government 
liquor stores and decide where they would be located. However, Swinton J, delivering the judgment 
of a unanimous Court, did not see this as providing a sufficient basis for an application for judicial 
review relating to the choice of private sector operator acting as agent of the government in a small 
Ontario community. According to the Court, this did not amount to a "statutory power of decision", 
a statutory term that the Court appeared to treat as a threshold to the availability of review under the 
Judicial Review Procedure Act. Leaving aside the question of whether the Act applied only to the 
exercise of a "statutory power of decision", a proposition that was in fact contrary to the 
jurisprudence,75 the Court spoke more generally of the decision as one that was not sufficiently 
public in its nature as to be amenable to the grounds and remedies of judicial review:76 
Courts have traditionally considered the process of awarding a government contract for goods and 
services to be a commercial matter that is governed by private law. In particular, it has been held that the 
decision to award a contract is not properly a subject for judicial review where there are no statutory 
  
73  2169205 Ontario Inc (cob Lefroy Freshmart) v Ontario (Liquor Control Board) 2011 ONSC 1878 (Div Ct). 
74  Judicial Review Procedure Act RSO 1990 c J1. 
75  See Bezaire v Windsor Roman Catholic Separate School Board (1992) 9 OR (3d) 737 (Div Ct). 
76  2169205 Ontario Inc (cob Lefroy Freshmart) v Ontario (Liquor Control Board), above n 73, at [24]. 
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provisions or regulations which prescribe how the government agency is to go about entering the 
contract in question.   
In so holding, the Court relied upon St Lawrence Cement,77 and distinguished the Divisional 
Court's own previous decision in Bot Construction Ltd v Ontario (Minister of Transportation).78 
There was "no broad public interest" in the award of a contract to run an agency liquor store such as 
was present in Bot Construction, a case involving the awarding of a road-widening contract.79 In 
Bot Construction, the Divisional Court had identified the following public interests in justification 
of its holding that the procurement process was amenable to judicial review:80 
The tendering decision of the MTO has obvious broad public interest implications that extend beyond 
the interests of the contracting parties, not only with respect to the fairness and integrity of the process 
followed in the expenditure of significant public funds – totaling $2 billion in 2008 and about $60 
million for this project. As noted in Shell [Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver]81 public concerns such as 
equality of access to government markets, integrity in the conduct of government business, and the 
promotion and maintenance of community values are relevant to government procurement powers. As 
well, the issues in the tendering process in this case have significant economic implications for both the 
steel industry in Canada and the road building industry in Ontario. The government is the only market 
for provincial road construction and it controls the pre-qualification of bidders and the economic 
opportunities for the road building industry. 
When evaluated against those criteria, the contract in Lefroy Freshmart was "a purely 
commercial arrangement",82 not involving the expenditure of public funds, with no impact on third 
parties, and up for re-tendering every five years with no preference to the incumbent.83 As opposed 
  
77  St Lawrence Cement v Ontario (Minister of Transportation), above n 59 and cited in 2169205 Ontario Inc 
(cob Lefroy Freshmart) v Ontario (Liquor Control Board) ibid. 
78  Bot Construction Ltd v Ontario (Minister of Transportation) (2009) 99 OR (3d) 104 (Div Ct). In fact, on 
appeal, Bot Construction was reversed on the merits of the Divisional Court's holding that the Ministry's 
conduct of the procurement process was unreasonable: Bot Construction Ltd v Ontario (Minister of 
Transportation) 2009 ONCA 879, 85 CLR (3d) 25. On the issue of the amenability of the procurement to 
judicial review, the Court stated at [19]: "We emphasise that we come to this conclusion without expressing 
any view as to the availability of judicial review with respect to the tendering process for government 
procurement contracts". 
79  Ibid; cited in 2169205 Ontario Inc (cob Lefroy Freshmart) v Ontario (Liquor Control Board), above n 76, at 
[30]. 
80  Bot Construction Ltd v Ontario (Minister of Transportation), above n 78, at [24]. 
81  Shell Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver [1994] 1 SCR 231 at [11]. 
82  2169205 Ontario Inc (cob Lefroy Freshmart) v Ontario (Liquor Control Board), above n 73, at [31]. 
83  Ibid at [32]. 
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to the situation in Bot Construction, the 2009 Procurement Directive of Management Board of 
Cabinet did not require the use of a competitive bidding process for the granting of a licence to run 
an agency liquor store. 
While there is no room for quarreling with these factual differentiations between the two 
procurement processes, what is also obvious is that the two cases by no means establish a bright line 
distinction between contracts that are sufficiently imbued with broader public interest concerns as to 
attract the grounds and remedies of public law and those that do not and which are relegated to the 
non-reviewable category of a purely commercial contract. 
The same is true of the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal in Irving Shipbuilding Inc v 
Canada (Attorney General),84 the judicial review equivalent of Design Services,85 in the sense that 
a subcontractor of an unsuccessful bidder (which was not suing) was seeking to have set aside on 
procedural unfairness grounds the award of a long-term contract to service Armed Forces 
submarines. There is nothing surprising in the judgment of Evans JA holding that, whatever the 
rights of the unsuccessful bidder, there was no basis for imposing an obligation on the Crown to 
afford procedural fairness in the course of the bidding process to potential subcontractors. However, 
characterising public contracts as resting "at the intersection of public law and private law",86 Evans 
JA in the list of considerations for denying process rights to the subcontractor did deploy at least one 
factor that would also have been relevant had the unsuccessful bidder been the applicant for review. 
After stating the public interest in the Crown "obtaining value for money by protecting the integrity 
of the procurement process" was not sufficient to justify extending procedural fairness rights to 
potential subcontractors,87 Evans JA went on to identify another public interest that pointed against 
the availability of judicial review in a procurement setting. Allowing judicial review in procurement 
settings would cause unnecessary delay in governments securing the goods and services needed for 
the effective discharge of their responsibilities; confining a disappointed bidder to an action for 
damages does not have that impact.88 Evans JA then proceeded to bolster this sense of an action for 
damages being the more appropriate remedy by reference to both Design Service and Dunsmuir. 
  
84  Irving Shipbuilding Inc v Canada (Attorney General) 2009 FCA 116, (2009) 314 DLR (4th) 340. 
85  Design Services Ltd v Canada, above n 35. 
86  Irving Shipbuilding Inc v Canada (Attorney General), above n 84, at [1]. 
87  At [51]. 
88  At [54]. 
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They exemplified the principle "that when the Crown enters into a contract, its rights and duties, and 
the available remedies, are generally to be determined by the law of contract".89 
Nonetheless, Evans JA was not prepared to close off completely the possibility of awarding 
public law relief even to a subcontractor, "where the misconduct of public officials was so egregious 
that the public interest in maintaining the essential integrity of the procurement process was 
engaged".90 
As examples, Evans JA instanced "fraud, bribery, corruption or other kinds of grave 
misconduct".91 This terminology is found in English and New Zealand case law, but difficult to 
reconcile with a unified or overarching conception of the principles of judicial review in which all 
exercises of public power are subject to either correctness or reasonableness review depending on a 
standard of review analysis. 
Subsequently, in Air Canada v Toronto Port Authority, Stratas JA, also of the Federal Court of 
Appeal, set out a list of criteria that are relevant to the determination of whether a matter is 
sufficiently public in nature as to come within the judicial review authority of the Federal Court and 
Federal Court of Appeal.92 In terms of the language of the Federal Courts Act 1985, what was at 
stake was whether the activities of the Toronto Port Authority that were being called into question 
by the applicant for relief were being carried out by the Authority as a "federal board, commission 
or other tribunal."93 According to Stratas JA, only if they were would they be subject to an 
application for judicial review.94 While this was not a case involving procurement in any 
  
89  At [60]. In this context, it is interesting to note the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in G-Civil 
Inc v Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services), one of four cases reported as TeleZone 
Inc v Canada (Attorney General) (2008) 94 OR (3d) 19 (CA), in which the Court rejected the Crown's 
contention that it was a prerequisite to the bringing of an action for breach of contract in a federal 
procurement setting that the plaintiff first applied successfully for judicial review of the award of the 
contract. While the Attorney General of Canada elected not to seek leave to appeal this decision, the 
judgment was in effect approved by the Supreme Court by the general rejection of this species of argument  
in one of the other four cases: Canada (Attorney General) v TeleZone Inc v Canada 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3 
SCR 585.  
90  At [61]. 
91  At [62]. 
92  Air Canada v Toronto Port Authority 2011 FCA 347. Unusually, the other two judges who sat on this case 
stated at [87]: "We have read the reasons now received from our colleague Stratas JA. We concur with his 
proposed disposition." Obviously, this calls into question the precedential value of the judgment.  
93  Federal Courts Act RSC 1985 c F-7, ss 2(1), 18(1) and 18.1. 
94  This is a limitation not directly expressed in the definition of "federal board, commission or other tribunal" 
in s 2(1) but operates by way of implication from that and the other relevant judicial review provisions of 
the Federal Courts Act. 
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conventional sense (it was a case about landing rights at a federally controlled and operated airport), 
Stratas JA's general elaboration of the nature of the powers of public bodies and the eight criteria are 
clearly transferable to any discussion of the contractual powers of government in general and 
procurement in particular. 
Before identifying the relevant criteria, Stratas JA stated:95 
Every significant federal tribunal has public powers of decision-making. But alongside these are express 
or implied powers to act in certain private ways, such as renting and managing premises, hiring support 
staff, and so on. In a technical sense, each of these powers finds its ultimate source in a federal statute. 
But, as the governing cases cited below demonstrate, many exercises of those powers cannot be 
reviewable. For example, suppose that a well-known federal tribunal terminates its contract with a 
company to supply janitorial services for its premises. In doing so, it is not exercising a power central to 
the administrative mandate given to it by Parliament. Rather, it is acting like any other business. The 
tribunal's power is best characterized as a private power, not a public power. Absent some exceptional 
circumstance, the janitorial company's recourse lies in an action for breach of contract, not judicial 
review of the tribunal's decision to terminate the contract. 
He then moved to an identification of the criteria that may need to be addressed in making the 
public/private determination:96 
• The character of the matter for which review is sought. 
• The nature of the decision-maker and its responsibilities. 
• The extent to which the decision is founded in and shaped by law as opposed to private 
discretion. 
• The body's relationship to other statutory schemes and other parts of government. 
• The extent to which a decision-maker is an agent of government or is directed, controlled 
or significantly influenced by a public entity. 
• The suitability of public law remedies. 
• The existence of compulsory power. 
• An "exceptional" category of cases where the conduct has attained a serious public 
dimension.  
  
95  Air Canada v Toronto Port Authority, above n 92, at [52]. 
96  At [60]. 
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This is a most useful list but one that in many instances will still require the courts to balance 
competing indicators arising out of a consideration of some or all of these factors. The bright line is 
still not there. However, as Stratas JA himself argues, any greater attempt at precision in resolution 
of the divide between public and private may not be feasible or even desirable given the range of 
activities that are potentially subject to this kind of inquiry and the range of judicial settings in 
which the question may arise.97  
B New Zealand 
1 Threshold 
In some respects, the law of New Zealand on judicial review of the exercise of contractual 
powers in general and procurement in particular may be more clear-cut than it is in Canada. In part, 
this is the result of 1977 amendments to the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, and defining 
"statutory power", a threshold to the application of the Act's judicial review provisions, as "a power 
or right conferred by or under any Act, or by or under the constitution or other instrument of 
incorporation, rules or bylaws of any body corporate".98 
While that definition does not reach the exercise of powers by companies incorporated under the 
general corporations legislation, it has certainly expanded the scope of judicial review of the Act to 
bodies that in other jurisdictions would be categorised as private in nature.99 Also, Taylor notes that 
even bodies not coming within the scope of s 3(1) of the Judicature Amendment Act may be subject 
to judicial review under residual common law powers, and provided for procedurally in pt 30 of the 
High Court Rules 2008. 
As a consequence, most of the New Zealand litigation in the domain of judicial review of 
contracting and procurement decisions tends to be concerned with the grounds and intensity of 
review rather than its availability, at least as a threshold matter. However, there are still some 
lingering questions about the reach of review under the Judicature Amendment Act and residual 
common law by way of pt 30 of the High Court Rules. These doubts emerge from the judgments of 
  
97  At [58]. 
98  Judicature Amendment Act 1977, s 10(1) amending the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 3(1) (emphasis 
added). 
99  For a more detailed discussion see Graham Taylor (ed) Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective, above 
n 11, chs 1 and 2. 
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the New Zealand Court of Appeal in both Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps,100 and 
Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board.101 
In the former, as well as confirming that review under the Judicature Amendment Act did not 
reach the commercial operations of all bodies corporate,102 the Court made it quite clear that there 
was almost certainly a gloss, in the form of a restriction on the reach of the term "statutory power" 
in s 3(1), of the kind that Stratas JA in Air Canada recognised in relation to the threshold provisions 
of the Federal Courts Act:103 
We are not concerned with a body making a series of commercial judgments nor … with someone 
making a decision on all manner of questions of public interest in a broad policy context. 
The first of these certainly suggests that not all contractual activity crosses the judicial review 
threshold, even for bodies that otherwise or in other respects are subject to review under the 
Judicature Amendment Act. The second qualification is rather more difficult to parse but may well 
represent a justiciability threshold that eliminates judicial review even for clearly statutory or 
governmental bodies.  
In Lab Tests, Arnold and Ellen France JJ in their joint judgment accepted that the Auckland 
District Health Board was subject to judicial review with respect to an RFP for the provision of 
pathology services. Rather, their major preoccupation was with the scope of the grounds of review 
in the context of that procurement exercise. In contrast, Hammond J noted that the parties to the 
litigation had accepted the availability of judicial review in the threshold sense.104 However, on the 
basis of a discussion of the law and literature on the public/private divide, he stated:105 
My concern is that I would not want it to be thought in other cases that, on the basis of what has 
happened in the case in front of us at this time, counsel can automatically assume reviewability in this 
subject area. 
  
100  Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps [1999] 3 NZLR 1 (CA). 
101  Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board, above n 7. Hanna Wilberg in "Administrative 
Law" [2010] NZ Law Review 177, at 180–183, canvasses this case extensively. She also identifies other 
authorities suggesting limits on the literal meaning of "statutory power" in the Judicature Amendment Act at 
178–181. 
102  Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps, above n 100, at 12. 
103  Ibid. 
104  Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board, above n 7, at [361]. 
105  At [360]. 
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He then concluded his judgment with the following, possibly for him, rhetorical question: 
"should the courts allow what may be thought to be more like private law issues to be litigated in 
public law drag?"106  
That this argument has some pull and that there may be room for further refinement of the 
threshold to judicial review under the Judicature Amendment Act may be seen in the decision of the 
Supreme Court of New Zealand denying leave to appeal in this case:107 
The Court of Appeal discussed the High Court Judge's approach to the questions of whether the decision 
of the Boards to enter into the contract was reviewable and as to the scope of any such review. In the 
reasons of the Appeal Court Judges, different possible approaches are identified. If the choice of the 
correct approach had been determinative, this may well have been a case for leave. The facts, as found 
by the Court of Appeal were, however, such that the outcome would be the same whatever approach is 
adopted 
In the concluding comments to their joint judgment, Arnold and Ellen France JJ expressed 
another concern about the appropriateness of judicial review for the kind of case that confronted the 
Court of Appeal in Lab Tests:108 
This is a lengthy judgment, much longer than is desirable. But to deal with the submissions advanced, 
we have had to examine the evidence in some detail. This process has highlighted that disputes such as 
this are not well-suited to being dealt with in judicial review proceedings, at least where there are 
broadly framed allegations of the type made in this case. The factual and other subtleties are too great to 
be dealt with in what is supposed to be "a relatively simple, untechnical and prompt procedure" … 
which normally does not involve cross-examination. 
This certainly suggests the possibility of denial of judicial review (most likely also as a 
threshold matter) on the basis of the existence of a more convenient alternative remedy, this time, a 
civil action in contract. To do that, of course, would then raise the Pratt Contractors question all 
over again: Should public law grounds of judicial review be available in the context of an action in 
contract (or some other civil proceeding) involving actions or decision-making otherwise amenable 
to judicial review under either the Judicature Amendment Act or pt 30 of the High Court Rules? 
2 Grounds 
Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd remains the leading authority 
on the scope of judicial review of government contracting decisions including procurement.109 It 
  
106 At [405]. 
107 At [4] (emphasis added). 
108  At [342] (citations omitted). 
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concerned a State Owned Enterprise's termination of a contract for the supply of bulk electricity. 
Notwithstanding the fact that State Owned Enterprises were registered under the Companies Act 
1955, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held there was a sufficient statutory and public 
flavour to bring their activities within the reach of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. However, 
thereafter, the Judicial Committee indicated that the scope for review at least on substantive grounds 
was exceptional. It started with the non-controversial statement that it was only if the decision was 
contrary to law that the Court could intervene.110 It was, however, in response to the arguments that, 
in this instance, the State Owned Enterprise had acted contrary to law by taking a decision that could 
not withstand scrutiny under Wednesbury unreasonableness principles,111 that the narrowness of the 
Privy Council's conception of the scope for intervention became apparent.112 In essence, the Privy 
Council conceded to the Electricity Corporation virtually unlimited discretion in its business 
judgments as to what would be appropriate to carry out its statutory mandate.113 That then led to the 
oft-quoted statement, picked up by Evans JA in a Canadian procurement setting in Irving 
Shipbuilding:114 
It does not seem likely that a decision by a state enterprise to enter into or determine a commercial 
contract to supply goods and services will ever be the subject of judicial review in the absence of fraud, 
corruption or bad faith. 
Of course, even in the domain of the substantive review of contracting powers, context is 
important and, under certain configurations, may dictate more intrusive review. In particular, as the 
majority of the Court of Appeal made clear in Lab Tests, context may also dictate otherwise. In 
particular, to take the authority of the courts further would require something like the statutory 
imposition of substantive limitations or obligations with respect to the contractual processes or their 
outcome.115 What is clear however from both the majority and concurring judgments in Lab Tests is 
that the Court of Appeal was counseling lower courts to exercise extreme caution in implying 
substantive obligations in this kind of setting particularly on the basis of a conception of the court's 
  
109  Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 385 (PC), discussed by 
Graham Taylor (ed) Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective, above n 11, at [2.04]. 
110 Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd, ibid at 528. 
111  Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA). 
112  On this, see the critical case comment by Michael Taggart "Corporatisation, Contracting and the Courts" 
[1994] PL 351. 
113  Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd, above n 109, at 390. 
114  Ibid at 391; see also Irving Shipbuilding Inc v Canada (Attorney General), above n 84. 
115  Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board, above n 7, at [45]. 
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role as the guardian of integrity, probity and good administration in the exercise of such powers. 116 
In other words, the judgment leaves no room for the imposition of an at-large unreasonableness or 
even Wednesbury unreasonableness standard of review, though Hammond J appears to want to leave 
open the possibility of some sort of substantive unfairness principle to counter an exercise of power 
that "is so grossly unfair that it ought to be impugned".117  
In the domain of process or fair procedures, the message is similar. Absent specific or very clear 
indicators in the relevant statute (such as consultation requirements) or possibly legitimate 
expectations arising out of specific assurances or relied on patterns of conduct, courts should not 
impose typical common law procedural fairness obligations in the context of judicial review of 
contracting, in general, and procurement in particular. This also meant that there was no room for 
the application of the reasonable apprehension of bias that generally applied to adjudicative bodies, 
and that the content of what was impermissible and reviewable conflict of interest and the use of 
confidential information (the principal bases of challenge in Lab Tests itself) should be carefully 
calibrated to "the nature of the body making the decision and the statutory setting within which the 
decision is made".118 
Nonetheless, the majority was prepared to expand on the grounds identified in Mercury Energy 
to include situations analogous to "fraud, corruption or bad faith." Moreover, as examples in the 
domain of process, the Court gave situations:119 
… where an insider with significant inside information and a conflict of interest has used that 
information to further his or her interests and to disadvantage his or her rivals in a tender. In such a case, 
it may be that the integrity of the contracting process has been undermined in the same way as in the 
case of corruption, fraud and bad faith. 
It is, however, significant that the Court of Appeal, relying in large measure on statutory context 
and a degree of tolerance for what in other settings might well have been regarded as a conflict of 
interest or improper use of confidential information, allowed the appeal from the judgment below in 
which the process had been found wanting on these very grounds. What may have at the end of the 
day been critical in all of this is that the first instance judge based these conclusions on a 'probity in 
  
116  At [60], [85] and [343]–[344] per Arnold and Ellen France JJ, and [367]–[369], and [401]–[403] per 
Hammond J. 
117 At [392]. 
118  At [57].  
119  At [91]. Hammond J appears much more skeptical about the place of judicial review for conflict of interest 
and improper use of confidential information at least in settings such as exemplified by government 
contracting (including procurement) regimes: ibid at [400]–[403].  
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public decision-making' approach.120 In short, as in the instance of substantive review of contracting 
decisions, it is going to take a very clear case for a procedural unfairness or process argument to 
prevail in this domain. 
V WHAT TO MAKE OF ALL OF THIS? 
The regulation of government contracting in general and procurement in particular is a complex 
task and the reality is that judicial review and private law actions based largely on common law 
precepts and principles cannot serve as anything other than a random regulator. It is also the case 
that there are strong practical reasons why affected parties and disappointed bidders in particular 
will not have recourse to the courts in such matters. Aside from the expense and potential for 
complexity in such litigation as well as the spectre of a 'deep pocket' defendant or respondent, as 
exemplified by Lab Tests, there are often strategic reasons for not litigating perceived grievances 
with procurement and contracting processes generally. Rightly or wrongly, litigating such cases 
against governments and public bodies might be seen as adversely affecting the prospects of future 
lucrative contracts with the same defendant or respondent. In the case of judicial review of 
procurement and other forms of contract awarding, even if the case is made out, it is unlikely to 
produce what the applicant really wants: the contract. By the time the case reaches the court on 
judicial review, it may simply be too late to undo an award of a contract and a mere declaration will 
be the only vindication, and, of course, if success on such an application is based on process 
grounds, as is more likely, the best that can be hoped for is a remission back to the authority for the 
process to be conducted all over again with no guarantee of success for the litigating party. 
In some cases such as Mercury Energy,121 and the judgment of Hammond J in Lab Tests,122 
store is placed in political accountability as the appropriate way in which to deal with the 
malfunctioning both procedurally and substantively of government and public agency contracting. 
However, except in the most egregious cases involving the most significant of government or public 
body contracts, conventional political accountability is not likely to be a very effective regulator 
either. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that the scope and intensity of judicial scrutiny of government 
contracting is currently at its apex in situations where there are broader public interests at stake (as 
evidenced by the judgment of the Ontario Divisional Court in Bot Construction), when it is these 
kinds of contract that are more likely to produce accountability in the political arena. 
Potentially far more effective as accountability mechanisms are internal government regimes 
charged with developing and policing legislatively or administratively developed principles and 
  
120  At [26], as described by Arnold and Ellen France JJ. 
121  Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd, above n 109, at 391. 
122  Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board, above n 7, at [403]. 
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rules respecting government contracting, and especially procurement. Indeed, to the extent that such 
regimes or specific calls for bids are either automatically subject to the scrutiny of a fairness 
commissioner or some like official or contain a readily accessible appeal mechanism, the chances of 
a process that works fairly and efficiently and in the interests of the public authority, bidders and the 
public interest increases exponentially. In this regard, a good example is provided by the complaints 
jurisdiction of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal established by the Canadian International 
Trade Tribunal Act 1985,123 and the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Inquiry Regulations.124 
It provides a model worthy of consideration.125 
Nonetheless, in both New Zealand and Canada, litigation in either the public or private law 
mode remains a reality, albeit a relatively infrequent one as emphasised by Hammond J in Lab 
Tests.126 As already noted, it is also a frequent source of complaint that that the jurisprudence in this 
area is inconclusive and often conflicting (even within the same jurisdiction) as to the appropriate 
principles. This makes litigation even more of a gamble than in other domains and that is regrettable 
for both private sector litigants, public bodies, and, more generally, the public interest. 
Let me, however, make some modest suggestions for resolving some of the problems emerging 
from the New Zealand and Canadian jurisprudence described in this paper. First, in so far as there 
are lingering doubts about the ability of litigants to rely on public law principles and rules when they 
elect to proceed by way of civil action, there seems no principled basis for denying litigants this 
capacity. Provided the matter is one which would, in a judicial review setting, attract the application 
of public law principles and rules, litigants should also be able to rely on those same public law 
principles and rules as the basis for or as part of the grounds of their civil action. As exemplified by 
cases as early as Cooper v Board of Works for Wandsworth District in 1863,127 the invocation of 
public law concepts has been acceptable in the setting of a civil suit. It is also worth recollecting 
that, albeit that it has now been discredited on other grounds, Knight v Indian Head School Division 
No 19 was an action for breach of contract.128  
  
123  Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act RSC 1985 (4th Supp) c 47. 
124  Canadian International Trade Tribunal Inquiry Regulations SOR/93-602. 
125  Though it should be noted that the decisions of this Tribunal are judicially reviewable by the Federal Court 
of Appeal under the Federal Courts Act: for example, see Cougar Aviation Ltd v Canada (Minister of Public 
Works and Government Services) (2000) 26 Admin LR (3d) 30 (FCA); Almon Equipment Ltd v Canada 
(Attorney General) (2010) 12 Admin LR (5th) 161 (FCA); and Northrop Grumman Overseas Services 
Corporation v Canada (Attorney General) 2009 SCC 50, [2009] 3 SCR 309. 
126  Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board, above n 7, at [396]–[397]. 
127  Cooper v Board of Works for Wandsworth District (1863) 143 ER 414 (CP). 
128  Knight v Indian Head School Division No 19, above n 62. 
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Related to this point, the courts in both countries should also accept that in many instances a 
civil action should be the preferred remedial choice even in situations where the litigant is 
challenging public contracting (including procurement) on public law grounds. There should 
generally be no quarrel with judges who exercise the discretion to deny public law relief on the 
ground that a civil action is a more appropriate remedy for any of the following reasons: the 
inappropriateness in the particular circumstances of public law remedies and especially a setting 
aside and the greater appropriateness of monetary relief (most commonly damages); the greater 
capacities of civil actions (as opposed to most forms of public law judicial review processes) to 
handle complex questions arising out of public contracts (and, in particular, where there are 
seriously contested facts); and the potential for the relevance of both private and public law 
principles in the particular litigation and the desirability of having all issues resolved in the one 
venue. 
In terms of the threshold for applications for judicial review, the courts should continue to be 
generous or liberal in making decisions on whether the threshold has been crossed leaving the 
difficult issues to be handled by reference to the availability of particular grounds of review and a 
consideration of the intensity with which review or scrutiny should be conducted. However, in 
principle, there should be no objection to courts imposing a gloss on the wording of the threshold 
provisions of judicial review statutes to exclude in limited cases those exercises of contractual and 
procurement power that are clearly (generally by virtue of clear legislative specification) subject 
only to private law principles and rules. 
In the domain of procedural challenges to contractual (including procurement) decisions, I can 
see nothing wrong with the current approach, which treats procedural claims in such cases as 
operating at the low or less formal end of a sliding scale of hearing obligations. This is the stuff of 
conventional judicial review law involving procedural challenges (including bias and conflict of 
interest). The level of entitlement at common law is very context sensitive and there is no reason for 
abandoning that approach in the instance of contracting generally and procurement in particular. 
Similarly and despite the fact that this is the basis of much criticism on the grounds of 
indeterminacy, I see no reason to deny the courts the capacity to calibrate the scope of substantive 
review not just by reference to the general characteristics of public contracting and procurement but 
to the specific contractual or procurement regime that is before the court. In doing so, the court 
should be paying attention as some judges have urged to a range of factors or considerations, most 
common among which are the particular nature of the decision-maker, the kind of decision that is 
before the court, and the particular details of the regime under which the contract is being formed or 
performed. In this context, it may be incumbent on the Canadian courts to recognise that their 'two 
sizes (correctness or reasonableness) fits all' brand of judicial review is simply not apposite to 
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accommodate the world of public contracting and procurement; that there may have to be some 
recognition of the importance of conducting review in this domain by reference to discrete grounds 
of judicial review.129   
This, of course, leaves much still to be resolved and, in particular, a more developed sense, 
beyond the Mercury Energy categories of the substantive grounds of review, of the badges of what 
constitute unfair treatment and failing to treat those seeking to enter contracts with the government 
equally in the context of procurement and other public and contractual decision-making.  
However, almost certainly the most important issue is that of articulating the values that 
reviewing courts should bring to the table when scrutinising public body contracting decisions and 
behaviour or, putting it another way, whether reviewing courts, either in judicial review or civil 
action mode, have any role to play in imposing broader public interest obligations on public bodies 
as contractors than they would on a purely private relationship, contractual or otherwise. This issue 
was joined in Lab Tests and largely resolved by all three judges against what counsel for the 
applicant/respondent urged on them: to approach the task of review from the perspective of a 
principle of "good hygiene in public decision-making".130  
As the discussion reveals, this is an issue that raises profound issues about the role of both 
courts and government. However, I would venture to say that there are principles of probity and 
integrity in the functioning of public authorities that should be legitimately available to reviewing 
courts without giving rise to the criticism that they are venturing into areas beyond their ken and 
inappropriately engaging in the substantive review of decisions best left to the public body subject 
to political checks. After all, if in a procurement setting, the objective is the integrity of the bidding 
system, there seems clear room in that context for taking into account at least some of the many 
public interest considerations identified by the Ontario Divisional Court in Bot Construction and 
that bear on the particular role and responsibilities of public bodies.   
 
  
129  In Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board, above n 7, at [374]–[378], Hammond J makes 
this point using, among others, the example of Canada. 
130  Ibid at [343]. 
